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This paper examines semiannual ex post returns on corporateequities and
bonds and six—month Treasury bills over the 1953—84 period withspecial
emphasis on whether returns so far in the 1980s have been usual relative to the
previous quarter century. The performance of the equity and bond markets in
the 1980s has not been at all unusual, with equity returnsbeing driven by the
businesscycle and bond returns by unexpected changes in new issue Treasury
bond rates. Real six—month Treasury rates have averaged 5½percentage points,
farabove the 2 percentage point average since 1953 but about the sameas in
the 1926—30 period. On an after—tax (roughly 40 percent) basis,however, real
bill rate have been in line with the 1950s and lOGOs, butsignificantly above







Debtand Equity Returns Revisited
Patric H. Hendershott
1.1 Introduction
In April 1981, near the beginning of the NBER project on Corporate
Capital Structures, I reported on the behavior of debt and equity returns over
the last half century. Resource utilization and inflation varied widely over
that period, as did real and nominal ex post returns on debt and equity claims.
My analysis of the factors affecting returns was based largely on a relatively
crude examination of the data. I return three and a half years later
(September 1984) with a shorter (quarter—century) perspective and with the
benefit of extensive econometric testing.
Some of the findings discussed in this chapter are the same as those
emphasized in my earlier paper. For example, a strong systematic relationship
between ex post equity returns and business cycle turning points seemed to
exist in my earlier analysis, with returns being extraordinarily large around
cycle troughs and small around cycle peaks. This relationship is easily
verifiable econometrically and is even stronger after 1980 than before. On the
other hand, data from the 1951—BO period were largely consistent with Treasury
bill rates moving one—for—one with expected inflation and being independent of
everything else, a view obviously inconsistent with the high real short—term
rates that have prevailed since 1980.
This chapter is divided into three broad parts and a short summary. I
begin with an analysis of ex post returns on corporate bonds and equities, then
turn to an examination of real after—tax six—month bill rates, and concludeconclude with an explanation of new issue coupons on six—month and 20—year
Treasury securities. Econometric results on the determinants of ex post
returns and new issue coupons are summarized. The general procedure is to
establish relationships on semi—annual data from the 1950s, 60s and 70s and
then to deduce their applicability to the early l980s.
1.2 The Business Cycle and Ex Post Equity and Bond Returns
My earlier study contained evidence that corporate equities systema-
tically outperformed corporate bonds near business cycle troughs and underper—
formed them near business cycle peaks. The evidence was obtained by dividing
the months between January 1926 and December 1978 into three types of periods:
those around peaks, those around troughs, and the remainder. The peak periods
were defined as the last six months of every expansion and the first half
(dropping fractions) or first six months, whichever was less, of every
contraction. The trough periods were defined as the last half (dropping
fractions) or last six months, whichever was less, of every contraction and the
first six months of every expansion. We then divided the total 1926—78 period
into ten overlapping intervals that contained single adjoining peaks and
troughs and all the surrounding months that did not overlap with adjacent peak
and trough periods. That is, the intervals extended from six months after a
trough to six months before the second following peak.
These ten overlapping intervals are listed at the left in Table 1.1.
Also reproduced are the arithmetic means (annualized) during the trough periods
within the interval, the peak periods within the interval, the normal months
(months not classified as either peak or trough months) ,andthe differences in
average returns between the peak and normal months and between the trough and
normal months. The latter were labeled the excess net returns near peaks and—3--
TaMeJ .1 AaasjaJDnnc between ket'jrm on Equitiesand Bond. Near
Troughs, Near Peaks, and InOtherPerIods (Percent)
Near Near Other Excess Excess
Troughs Peaks Months Near Troughs Near Peaks
1an26—Feb29 35 20 21 14 —I June2S—Nov36 30 —4 1 29 —5
0ct33—Aug44 34 —32 8 26 —40 Jan39—May 48 31 21 4 27 17
May4ó—1an53 36 —9 13 23 —22
MaySO—Feb57 43 —5 21 22 —26 Dec54—0ct59 45 —11 18 27 —29 NosrSS.-June69 31 —12 8 23 —20
SepL6I—May73 23 —13 5 18 —ig June7l—flec7g 23 —9 —4 27 —5
Mean 33 —5 10 24 —15 StdDev. 7 16 9 5 17
Sources: Rendershcjtt (1982, Table 1.5,p. 25)—4-.
troughs, respectively. As noted, the data were striking. The excess net
returns on equities around troughs averaged 24 percent, and no net return was
less than 14 percent. In contrast, the excess net returns on equitieswere
negative around all peaks, except that at the end of World War II, and averaged
—15 percent. When the analysis was restricted to the six cycles between 1946
and 1978, the average excess net return on equities around peaks was —20
percent and no return exceeded —5 percent.
These data raise three questions. First, are equity returns, bond
returns, or both, sensitive to the business cycle? Second, can a significant
proportion of the variation in equity and/or bond returns during the 1953—79
period be explained by the business cycle turning points? Third, has the
importance of the turning points continued in the 1980's? To answer these
questions, we begin with a regression of ex post six—month returns (times 2 to
annualize them) on equities and bonds on constant terms and two turning point
variables. The variables assume values equal to the fraction of the halfyear
that consists of, respectively, peak or trough months as defined in the
previous paragraph.1 (Given that the average cycle is just under five years,
the economy is near a peak about one—fifth of the time and near a trough
another one—fifth.) The results are for the 54 semi—annual observations in the
1953—79 period. As can be seen from the first equation summarized in Table
1.2, all three variables are statistically significant in the equity equation
(t—statistics are in parentheses under the coefficients)
,and36 percent of the
variation in six—month returns is explained. Further, the second equation
shows that while the trough variable is marginally significant in the bond














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































percent of the variation in bond returns is explained. Thus, the answers to
the first and second questions are that the business cycle impacts largely on
equity, not bond, returns and that the impact is large. In roughly the year
surrounding business cycle troughs, the return on equities is 32 percentage
points greater than the normal 9 percent. In roughly the year around peaks,
the return is 20 percentage points less than the 9 percent norm.
This conclusion is supported by two additional tests reported in Table
1.2.2 In the first,we examine the excess of equity and bond returns over the
the six—month bill rate at the beginning of the half year. The results are
changed little from the straight returns equations. Second, we add the
unexpected capital gain on 20—year Treasury bonds during the six—month period,
fJNCG, as a regressor, where
tJNCG —UNIR2O(1 +R20)20—1 ——
R20 (1 +R20)20
and the calculation of unexpected change in the 20—year rate, UNAR2O, is
described in Hendershott and Huang (1984, Appendix B) .Forcescausing
unexpected capital gains (and thus large returns) on one asset will also induce
large returns on assets that are close substitutes. The unexpected—gains
variable has a negligible impact on equity returns, but an enormous positive
effect on corporate bond returns, as indicated by the last equation in Table
1.2. clearly corporate and Treasury bonds are very close substitutes, and thus
unexpected Treasury rate changes explain most of the movement in ex post
corporate bond returns. Also, the slight impact the trough cycle variable—7—
seems to have on corporate bond returns is due to a correlation between this
variable and unexpected changes in the Treasury rate, not to the independent
effect of the trough variable.3
The actual and predicted [by the first equation in Table 1.2] equity
returns are plotted in Figure 1.1. The 54 points to the left of the vertical
line are in sample; the 9 points to the right are forecasts for the 1980—midB4
period. 12 sample the equation misses the entire early 1962 stock market
plunge, much of the early 1970 (Cambodian incursion) crash, and more than the
entire late 1974 decline, Of course, each of these market sell offs, and the
corresponding equation error, was largely reversed in the subsequent six
months.(The general negative correlation of errors was indicated by the 2.52
Durbin—Watson ratio.)
The estimated equation is considerably more successful in explaining
equity returns the 1980s than during the estimation period itself. Most of the
large gains in 1980 and the mid1982—midl9g3 period occurred in near trough
periods and thus are picked up by the equation. The root mean square error is
0.190, about the same as during the estimation period, but the volatility of
returns so far in the 1980s has been far greater than in the previous quarter
century. The cycle dummies explain 72 percent of the variation of equity
returns in the first half of the 1980s, about double the percent explained
during the estimation period.
As another measure of the forecasting ability of this equation, I





























































CUMERR = II (1 +2
—
i=1
where ERR, is the error from the estimated equation in the ithperiod.
The result is a negligible 0.003. That is, the 4½year forecast of the stock
market plus cumulative dividends is within a halfpercent of the actual. So
our third question ——doesthe estimated cyclical influence on equities holdup
in the 1980s? ——isanswered strongly in the affirmative.4
While the cycle dummy variables explain over a third of the variation in
equity returns over the 1953—79 period, the variables obviously cannot explain
extended market booms or busts, and there was, of course, a major market
collapse between 1968 and 1978, with most of the decline coming after 1972. To
illustrate the failure of our equation to capture this decline,unity plus the
cumulative error over the 1953—79 period is plotted in Figure 1.2. Along with
it is Tobin's average q, the ratio of the market value (debt plusequity) of
firms to the replacement cost of assets, as presented in the 1983 Economic
Report of the President (Table 3—88, p. 263) .Thegeneral correlation between
the series, especially after 1962, is obvious. The existence of the 1969—78
decline and the failure of the regression equation to capture itexplains the
low (0.36) explanatory power in the 1953—79 period relative to the first half
of the 1980s, when no prolonged decline (or increase) occurred.
Many explanations have been advanced for the 1969—78 stock market decline
(see Hendershott, 1981, for a summary and critique of most of them)
,butthat
which I find most appealing is the "relative factor price hypothesis,"0.5
FIGURE 1.2
THECLIMLILAT lyE STOCK MARHET EFECP
[El AND TOBIN'S U WI, 1955-1973











































according to which unanticipated relative factor price changes caused
previously optimal outstanding capital to become suboptimal. Given a putty—
clay technology, the profitability of existing capital, and thus the value of
ownership claims to this capital, declined in response to sharp revisions in
expectations regarding factor prices. Most of the roughly one—third decline in
q after 1972 can, in fact, be explained by unexpected factor price changes
(Elmer and Hendershott, 1984)
1.3 Nominal and Real Short—Term Interest Rates and Inflation
When I examined interest rates and inflation in early 1981, financial
economists were still in the 'Fama era" of constant real interest rates. Study
after study of data from the 1950s, 60s and 70s documented the roughly one—
for—one response of interest rates to changes in inflation. Between 1952 and
1980, the real one—month bill rate averaged one—half percent with a standard
deviation of only 1½percent.I noted, however, that the real bill rate was
not constant prior to 1951. Most important, the real rate exceeded 4 percent
in each year in the 1926—30 period.5
Interest rates have become a far more interesting topic in recent years.
No longer is every little squiggle in nominal rates attributed to a change in
expected inflation (although the St. Louis Fed seemed rather reluctant to give
up this view) ,andnumerous papers have recently been written on why interest
rates are too high relative to inflation. And high they are. Since late 1980,
real six—month Treasury bill rates have averaged around s½percent.Very
likely, the real six—month bill rate will exceed 4 percent in each year in the
1981—84 period, strikingly similar to the late l920s.—12—
Figure 1.3 contains plots of the real six—month bill rate, before and
after tax. The bill rate is the average of daily figures (of beginning and end
of month data before 1960) ,ona bond—equivalent basis, for June and December
of the years 1954—84, and the expected inflation rate is the corresponding
number for six—month inflation from the Livingston survey. The extraordinarily
high level of real bill rates in the l9BOs is obvious. In the eight
observations from December 1980 to June 1984, the real bill rate averaged 5 2/3
percent. This is 4 percentage points higher than the average of the 1960s and
1970g.
The appropriate tax rate to employ in a study of real after—tax bill
rates is uncertain, and it would probably not be difficult to find economists
who would advocate rates as low as zero and as high as the corporate tax rate.
One possible way of determining the relevant tax rate is to compare the yields
on high quality tax—exempt securities with those on bills6 The real after—tax
bill rate, according to this scheme1 is then the tax—exempt rate less the
expected inflation rate. This representation of the after—tax real bill rate,
indicated by the dashed line in Figure 1.3, tells a far different story than
the before—tax real rate. In only one observation in the 1980s (June 1982) is
the real after—tax rate out of line relative to the 1960s. The rate is high in
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The data in Table 1.3 highlight the instability of real interest rates,
whether the marginal tax rate of investors is as low as zero or as high as 0.4,
during the last decade relative to the preceding two decades. The real rate
based on a zero tax investor averaged 2.43 percent in the 1954—73 period with a
standard deviation (listed in parenthesis beneath the mean) of only 0.93
percent. For the remainder of the 1970s, the rate fell to 0.85 percent, and it
then jumped to 5.66 percent during the last four years. In spite of the
subdivision of the last decade into two parts, the standard deviation of the
real rate within the last subperiod was 50 percent higher than during the
entire earlier two decades. The increase in the standard deviation is an even
greater 100 percent if the tax bracket implied by the ratio of exempt to
taxable rates is utilized. Note that real after—tax rates based on this tax
bracket are extraordinarily low in the l974—midlBO period and are not higher
in the 1980s than they were in the 1954—73 period.
The last column in Table 1.3 contains the average difference between the
rate of change in the consumer price index net of the shelter component (to
exclude the impact of changes in home mortgage rates) for each six—month period
less that forecast by Livingston interviewees at the beginning of the period.
Unanticipated inflation so—measured averaged one percent in the 1954—73 period,
2 percent in the l974—midso span (which included half of the first oil price
shock and all of the second) ,and—l 1/3 percent since then. For those who
might think that actual inflation is a better measure of expected inflation
than is the Livingston forecast, this unexpected inflation series should be
subtracted from the real interest rates in Table 1.3 to obtain preferred
measures of real rates. This adjustment would increase the already enormous
rise in real rates between the 1970s and l9SOs by 3¼ percentage points-.—15—
Table 1.3: Real After—Tax Treasury Bill Rates
Nominal Expected Real After—Tax Rate Unanticipated 6—Month 6—Month Tax—Rate—Inflation
Bill Rate Inflation 0 0.423a




l974—nijd8o 7.58 7.02 0.85 —2.70b 1.95
(1.13) (0.66)




aThIS is unity less theaverage ratio of the yields on one—year tax—exempt
(prime grade) taxable (Treasury) securities over the 1954—84period. The
actual ratio for each period is employed in the calculations.
bThe standard deviations ofthe real after—tax rates are reported in
parentheses underneath the mean values.
Sources: The text and Hendershott (1984)—16—
Given that economists are unsure of even what the interest rate puzzle is
——highreal rates in the l9HOs, low rates in most of the l970s, or both ——it
should not be surprising that there is little agreement on the determinants of
rates. Wilcox (1983) attributes the low real rates in the middle 1970s to
supply shocks (to the increase in real import prices) -Many,most notably
Clarida and Friedman (1984) ,citetight money for the higher rates in the 1980s
until late 1982, and Hendershott and Shilling (1982) and deLeeuw and Holloway
(1983) point to the business tax cuts and easy fiscal policy generally as the
source of high rates. Others cite deregulation, volatile money growth,
volatile interest rates and so on.
14 An Explanation of Changes in New Issue Yields
Changes in new issue yields are of paramount importance to ex post bond
returns. These changes are also important to ex post equity returns insofar as
real interest rates influence the business cycle. And while I would not
overemphasize the importance of real rates ——whowould dare in light of the
1983—84 economic expansion? ——thereis no doubt that real rates matter. Thus
I conclude this chapter with an examination of the determinants of changes in
new issue rates.
Given the diverse views held by financial economists on the determinants
of interest rates, a consensus interpretation of their views cannot be
presented. I will simply summarize the findings of my research. My framework
draws together two views of interest rate determination: the expectations
theory, whereby expected changes in rates can be inferred from forward rates,
and structural models of rates in which unexpected changes in rates can be
attributed to unanticipated changes in expected inflation, economic activity1
monetary growth, and possibly other factors. The variables explained are the—17—
changes, over semi—annual periods, in the six—month and20—year Treasury rates
described earlier. For unanticipated changes inexpected inflation and
economic activity, I utilize the difference betweenactual data and Livingston
Survey expectations of inflation 6 and 12 months in the futureand of
industrial production 6 months out; formonetary growth I use the difference
between the current growth rate and thatduring the previous two years (no
survey data are available) .Thedata are described in Hendershott (1984)
While the inflation expectations data areappropriate for the six—month bill
rate, they are obviously an extremely rough approximation to theexpectations
relevant to a long—term interest rate.
The results of this estimation are summarized in Table1.4, in which only
coefficients on the key variables are reported. The billrate equation is
estimated on data beginning in 1960 when data for 12—monthbills first became
available; the estimation ends in 1979 in order to determine theability of
rate relations estimated prior to the l980s to explain themovement of rates in
the early 1980s. The equations explain about a third of thechanges in rates.
To no one's surprise, I trust, expected inflation matters.The 0.738
coefficient in the bill rate equation (with a standarderror of 0.24) is
consistent with the results of a large number of previous studies.The low
(0.18) coefficient in the bond—rate equation probably reflectsa general
tendency for long—run expected inflation to move by much smaller amounts than
short—run expected inflation.
Possibly to the surprise of some, real activity also matters to debt
yields.8 These estimatessuggest that, other things being equal, the six—month
bill rate will be about 2percentagepoints higher when the economy is—18—
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operating at 90 percent capacity than when it is at 70percent capacity, and
the 20—year bond rate will be about three—quarters ofa point higher. The
cyclical movement of the real bill rate is obvious fromFigure 1.1, where high
values occur around all business cycle peaks(1953, 1957, 1959, 1969, 1973 and
1979). Moreover, analysis, in a somewhat differentframework, of the one—month
bill rate is fully consistent with this result.Hendershott and Huang (1984)
conclude that the one—month rate would be a full 2½points higher.
Most surprising, at least to some academics, is the roleof expected
interest rate changes. Recent research has attacked theexpectations theory of
the term structure of interest rates; expectedchanges in rates implied by
forward rates are said to have negative value inexplaining ex post rate
changes.9 In contrast, the estimatedcoefficients reported in Table 1.4 are
close to the expected value of unity and aresignificantly positive at the 95
and 90 percent confidence levels, respectively.
The estimated (through December 1979) equations have beenused to
interpret the rise and fall in the rates between June 1978 andDecember 1982.
Table 1.5 contain the results. Eighty percent (6.70percentage points) of the
8.42 increase in the bill rate to December 1980 isexplained by the equation.
Over 5 points is due to unexpected increases in anticipatedinflation, two—
thirds of a point to unexpected increases in output, one—halfpoint to the
increase in inflation uncertainty and one—third point to otherfactors.
Because the expected inflation rate rose by only 4.1percentage points, the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































estimated equation explains 2.6 (6.7 —4.1)points or sixty percent. The
estimated relationship also explains 60 percent of theextraordinarily high
average real bill rates in the early l9EOs.
One and a half percentage points of the 2.6percentage—point explained
increase in the real bill rate can be attributed to theunanticipated increases
in industrial production, inflationuncertainty and other factors noted above.
However, the primary single factor contributing to the risewas unexpected in-
creases in inflation far in excess of the actual 4.1percentage point increase.
From mid1978 to midl979, no increase was expected, buta two point rise
occurred. From late 1979 to late 1980 half point increaseswere anticipated,
while the actual expected rate rose by another twopoints. In total, the
cumulated unexpected increase in anticipated inflationover this span was a
full 7 percentage points. Even though the estimated coefficienton expected
inflation increases is only 0.74, implying that the nominal billrate rises by
only three—quarters of a point for every point of unanticipated increasein
inflation, the forecasted nominal bill rate rises by 5.2 points becauseof this
7 point increase and thus the real bill rate risesby over a full point.
Between the end of 1980 and the end of 1982, the bill rate declinedby
nearly 7½ percentage points. Nearly 95 percent of this decline isexplained by
the estimation equation. All the factors that contributedto the early
increase in the bill rate reversed themselves, inducing the decline.
Unexpected declines in industrial production, inflation uncertainty, and the
catch—all "other" tended to lower the real rate by 3percentage points, but a
smaller decline in unexpected than actual inflation, along with theonly
partial (0.74) response of nominal rates to unexpected changes in inflation,
partially offset the decrease in the real rate.—22—
This explanation of the bill rate cycle is remarkably good, inmy less
than humble opinion, because most of the unprecedented increase inrates and
all of the decrease came after the estimation period. Twoproblems of the
forecast should be noted, however. First, the equation does notpick up the
interyear oscillations in either 1980 (due to the credit controls, see footnote
7) or 1982. second, the forecasted 6—month rate is 1 1/3percentage points
above the actual value at the end of 1982 (the 1.72 point underestimate ofthe
increase less the 0.41 point underestimate of the decrease).Thatis, the real
rate is 1 1/3 points too high (relative to 1978),possiblydue to some of the
factors discussed earlier but not captured in our equation.
A similar, but far less satisfactory, explanation of the bond ratecycle
is also summarized in Table 1.5. The inability to explain muchmore than a
quarter of the rise in this rate almost certainly follows from the inadequacy
of the six—month expected inflation rate as aproxy for long—run expected
inflation. Long—run expected inflation likely rose by about as muchas short—
run expected inflation did in the 1978—80 period, but the 0.18 coefficienton
the unexpected change in expected inflation translates the increase inexpected
inflation into only one—quarter as large an impact on the bond rateas on the
bill rate. The ability of the equation to explain three—quarters of the
decline in the bond rate suggests that long—run expected inflation hasnot
fallen nearly as much as short—run expected inflation, which seemsquite
plausible in light of the large outyear structural deficits.
1.5 Summary
A strong relationship has existed between ex post equity returns and
business cycle turning points since at least 1926: Somewhere around business
cycle peaks ——duringthe last half year of the expansion or the first half of—23—
the contraction ——investorssharply reduce their expectations regarding future
returns on equities, and the reverse occurs around business cycletroughs ——
duringthe last half of recessions and the first six months of upswings. Asa
result, stock prices rise near troughs and fall near peaks. During the 1953—79
period, ex post equity returns were 32 percent greater than the 9percent norm
in the year (roughly) surrounding troughs, and 21percent less than the norm in
theyear surrounding peaks. This cyclical phenomenon alone explains over a
third of the movement in returns. In the first nine semiannualperiods in the
l980s, forecasts of returns based on the 1953—79 relationship explain over 70
percent of the movement in returns, and the cumulative error of a forecast of
the stock market and cumulative dividends is less than onepercent. Stock
market performance so far in the l980s has not been at all unusual.
In contrast, the level of real interest rates so far in the 1980s differs
markedly from the prior quarter (nearly half) century. Nominal Treasury bill
rates moved one—for—one, or slightly less, with changes in expected inflation
during the 1951—79 period, resulting in relatively constant real bill rates
which averaged 2 percent. In the 1980s, real rates have averaged over
percent, duplicating the experience of the late 1920s. The source of the
present high real rates is unclear, with various authors citing tight money (at
least until late 1982) ,increasedvolatility of interest rates and monetary
growth, easy fiscal policy, business tax incentives, and deregulationamong
other reasons. More important1 on an after—tax basis real rates are no higher
now than in the 1950s and l9GOs. What was unusual were the low real after—tax
rates in the l970s.
My own research on new—issue Treasury coupon rates draws on two views of
interest rate determination; the expectations theory, whereby expected changes
in rates can be inferred from forward rates, and structural models of rates in—24—
which unexpected changes in rates can be attributed to unanticipatedchanges in
expected inflation, economic activity, monetary growth, and possibly other
factors. The first important result is the consistency of the data with the
expectations theory. While expected rate changes explain little of observed
changes in new—issue rates, the data are consistent with the expectations
theory. A second result is a strong positive relationship between Treasury
rates and economic activity. As operation of the economy increases from 70
percent of capacity to 90 percent, real Treasury rates rise by 2½ percentage
points at the short (one month) end of the term structure to three—quarters of
a point at the long (20 year) end.
In spite of the "success' of this research, the difficulties of
forecasting interest rates should be obvious. Expected changes in rates
explain a miniscule 2 percent of actual changes because surprises are so
prevalent. Moreover, 'knowing" inflation, real activity, and money surprises
increases the ex post explanatory power only to one—third. My sympathygoes
out to those forecasting interest rates for a living.—25—
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1. Cycle turning points through the January 1980 peak are listed in
Hendershott (1982, Table 1.3, p. 21). Since then the U.S. economy has
experienced a trough in July 1980, a peak in July 1981 and a trough in
November 1982.
2. See Hendershott and Huang (198 for a wide variety of estimates.
3. While a number of proxies for unexpected capital gains on equities (or
changes in its required rate of return) were tested in the equities
equation, none significantly diluted the estimated impact of the turning—
point variables.
4. While hardly surprising, I note that ex post bond returns have continued in
the 1980s to be largely explained by unanticipated changes in new issue
coupon rates on 20 year Treasuries.
5. Between 1931 and 1951 the nominal bill rate was near zero and thus the real
rate was roughly the negative of the inflation rate and ranged between 10
percent in 1931 and —17 percent in 1946.
6. Unity less the ratio of prime grade one—year municipal rates to one—year
Treasuries, both from Salomon and Hutzler, is utilized.-25-
7. One extreme outlier in both rateseries in recent years is worthy ofnote.
The —3 percent real bill rate in June 1980was 2½ percent below any other
observed bill rate in the entireperiod, and the —6.3 percent after—tax
real rate was also 2½ percent belowany other. The record declines to
unprecedented lows and the even sharper immediate
reversals cry out for an
extraordinary explanation. Fortunately, one isavailable. In March 1980,
the Federal Reserve implemented a creditcontrols program that included a
noninterest bearing reserve requirement of 15percent on increases in
credit. Apparently as a result,consumer installment credit outstanding
contracted at an annual rate of 10½percent in the April—May period, the
first decline since May 1975 and thelargest reduction since World War II.
The controls program was eased in lateMay and terminated on July 24, 1980.
8. Clarida and Friedman (1984) and Makinand Tanzi (1983) also report large
real income effects.
9. See Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz(1983) and Mankiw and Summers (1984).
However, Fama (1983) finds a modest value inforecasts, and Brennan and
Schwartz (1982) and Buser and Hendershott(1984) report evidence of short
rates reverting toward long rates.